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INTRODUCTION 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
(the ―Tobacco Control Act‖ or the ―Act‖), enacted on June 22, 
2009, is anti-tobacco legislation that explicitly affects sports 
and entertainment sponsorships by banning all remaining 
tobacco-brand advertisements.1  This legislation, although 
undoubtedly important, also raises significant constitutional 
questions.  The Tobacco Control Act bars—through the Food 
and Drug Administration‘s (FDA) implementing 
regulations2—tobacco manufacturers from promoting their 
brands through sponsorship of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or 
other social or cultural event[s].‖3  Although this legislation 
has been said to ―serve[] as a crowning achievement of the 
efforts by anti-smoking advocates to stop individuals, notably 
teenagers, from starting the habit,‖4 the advertising 
restrictions contained in the bill may  jeopardize sponsorships 
for sports and entertainment events and may be 
constitutionally suspect.5  In fact, under the applicable 
standard for analyzing the constitutionality of commercial 
speech, the Tobacco Control Act may be found to be in 
violation of the First Amendment to the United States 
 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C.A.). 
 2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 § 105(a)(1), 21 
U.S.C.A. § 387f-1(a)(1) (2010) (―Not later than [six] months after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . shall develop and publish a 
action plan to enforce restrictions . . . on promotion and advertising of menthol and 
other cigarettes to youth.‖). 
 3. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010).   
 4.  Mark Conrad, The New Anti-Tobacco Legislation, Sports Events and 
Commercial Speech, SPORTS LAW BLOG (June 24, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2009/06/new-anti-tobacco-legislation-sports.html. 
 5. Id. 
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Constitution.6   
Part I of this Comment will outline the Tobacco Control 
Act, focusing on the specific provisions relating to the 
regulation of tobacco advertising at sports and entertainment 
events as well as the goals of the legislation.  Part II will 
discuss the history and progress of anti-tobacco legislation 
restricting advertising with a focus on the constitutional 
attacks and objections raised during the hearing phase of the 
Tobacco Control Act‘s ratification.  Part III will discuss the 
history of commercial speech protections afforded under the 
First Amendment.  Additionally, it will examine related case 
law applying the doctrine in various contexts, and will provide 
a detailed discussion of the prevailing framework for 
analyzing the constitutionality of regulations on commercial 
speech.  Lastly, Part IV will apply the prevailing test outlined 
in Part III to the Tobacco Control Act to determine the likely 
result of a similar constitutional challenge brought before the 
Supreme Court.  
I.  THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO 
CONTROL ACT 
Under the Tobacco Control Act, Congress effectively gave 
the FDA regulatory power over tobacco products.7  Although 
the purpose of the Act is to help curb adolescent tobacco use,8 
the adult tobacco market will suffer as a result of these broad 
regulations.  The objective of the Act is primarily to prohibit 
tobacco companies from marketing and advertising their 
products in ways that appeal to children.9  The ―law [is] the 
first big federal step against smoking since the 1971 ban 
against tobacco advertising on television and radio and the 
 
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 7.  TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO: 
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY 1 (2009), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/fda-1.pdf . 
 8. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-31, § 3(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009). 
 9. See generally Emily P. Walker, House Committee Approves Bill to Give FDA 
Tobacco Authority, Post to Washington Watch, MEDPAGE TODAY (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/13126. 
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1988 rules against smoking on airline flights.‖10  Indeed, the 
Act aims to curb ―the use of tobacco by young people‖11 while 
―continu[ing] to permit the sale of tobacco products to 
adults.‖12  To that end, however, the Tobacco Control Act 
significantly restricts the ability of tobacco producers to 
manufacture and distribute their products while 
simultaneously closing the door to sports and entertainment 
related tobacco sponsorships.13 
A.  Provisions of the Act Pertaining to Sports and 
Entertainment Events 
Under the Tobacco Control Act, the FDA now has ―wide-
ranging authority to regulate tobacco product marketing,‖ 
including the power to implement new regulations in the 
future.14  In addition to the bans in sports and entertainment, 
the Act also prohibits outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of 
schools and playgrounds, free giveaways of any non-tobacco 
items, free samples, and the sale of cigarettes in packages 
that contain fewer than twenty cigarettes.15  The Act also 
limits any outdoor and all point-of-sale tobacco advertising to 
black text on white background only—except in adult only 
facilities—advertising in publications with significant teen 
readership to black text on white background only, and audio-
visual advertising to black text on white background visuals 
and spoken words.16 
With respect to prohibitions on sports and entertainment 
events, section 102 of the Tobacco Control Act sets forth 
specific provisions aimed toward the advertising of tobacco 
products at these events.17  Under these provisions, the Act 
bars tobacco manufacturers from promoting their brands 
 
 10. Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/business/12tobacco.html; see also 
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the Tobacco 
Control Act ―[r]epresents the most sweeping action taken to date‖). 
 11.  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 § 3(2). 
 12. § 3(7). 
 13. See generally Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A.).  
 14. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 17.  
 15. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 102(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1830–32; 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)  
 16. § 102(a)(2), § 897.30(b). 
 17. § 102(a)(2)(G); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(d)(1), (d)(3)(A)–(B) (2010).  
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through sponsorship of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or other 
social or cultural event[s].‖18  These provisions also ban:  
[M]anufacturer[s], distributor[s], [and] retailer[s] [from] 
distribut[ing] or caus[ing] to be distributed any free samples of 
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products. . . [, and]  
. . . .  
manufacturer[s], distributor[s], or retailer[s] [from] distribut[ing] or 
caus[ing] to be distributed any free samples of smokeless tobacco  
(A) to a sports team or entertainment group; or  
(B) to any football, basketball, baseball, soccer, or hockey 
event or any other sporting or entertainment event 
determined by the Secretary to be covered by this 
subparagraph.19   
The Tobacco Control Act, does not, however, ―prohibit a 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer from distributing or 
causing to be distributed free samples of smokeless tobacco in 
a qualified adult-only facility.‖20  
 
 18. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010).   
 19. § 1140.16(d)(1), (d)(3)(i)–(ii); § 102(a)(2)(G) 
 20. § 1140.16(d)(2); § 102(a)(2)(G).  For purposes of this section, the term ―qualified 
adult-only facility‖ is defined as a facility or restricted area that:  
(i) requires each person present to provide to a law enforcement officer 
(whether on or off duty) or to a security guard licensed by a governmental 
entity government-issued identification showing a photograph and at least the 
minimum age established by applicable law for the purchase of smokeless 
tobacco; (ii) does not sell, serve, or distribute alcohol; (iii) is not located 
adjacent to or immediately across from (in any direction) a space that is used 
primarily for youth-oriented marketing, promotional, or other activities; (iv) is 
a temporary structure constructed, designated, and operated as a distinct 
enclosed area for the purpose of distributing free samples of smokeless tobacco 
in accordance with this subparagraph; and (v) is enclosed by a barrier that—
(I) is constructed of, or covered with, an opaque material (except for entrances 
and exits); (II) extends from no more than 12 inches above the ground or floor 
(which area at the bottom of the barrier must be covered with material that 
restricts visibility but may allow airflow) to at least 8 feet above the ground or 
floor (or to the ceiling); and (III) prevents persons outside the qualified adult-
only facility from seeing into the qualified adult-only facility, unless they make 
unreasonable efforts to do so; and (vi) does not display on its exterior—(I) any 
tobacco product advertising; (II) a brand name other than in conjunction with 
words for an area or enclosure to identify an adult-only facility; or  (III) any 
combination of words that would imply to a reasonable observer that the 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has a sponsorship that would violate 
section 897.34(c).   
§ 1140.16(d)(iii)(A)–(F)(iii); § 102(a)(2)(C)(i)–(vi). 
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B.  Goals Purported to Be Targeted by the Tobacco Control 
Act 
The aim of the Tobacco Control Act is to reduce 
adolescents‘ access to tobacco products and to diminish the 
appeal of these products to America‘s youth.21  ―The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the new law 
would reduce youth smoking by [eleven] percent and adult 
smoking by [two] percent over the next decade, in addition to 
reductions already achieved through other actions, like higher 
taxes and smoke-free indoor space laws.‖22  The Act proposes 
to achieve this end by restricting the means by which tobacco 
companies advertise and market their products.23   
Indeed, the drafters of the Act announced that its aim is to 
―ensure that the [FDA] has the authority to address issues of 
particular concern to public health officials, especially the use 
of tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.‖24  
Evincing the Act‘s aim of curbing the appeal of tobacco to 
adolescents is its ban of all outdoor tobacco advertisements 
within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds and its bar of 
colorful advertisements and store window displays in favor of 
advertisements consisting solely of black and white text.25  
Further bolstering the Tobacco Control Act‘s goals is 
section 105 regarding the enforcement action plan for 
advertising and promotion restrictions.26  Specifically, this 
section mandates that a plan is to be developed and published 
―to enforce restrictions . . . on [the] promotion and advertising 
of menthol and other cigarettes to youth.‖27  The ―community 
assistance‖ subparagraph to section 105 additionally provides 
that ―[a]t the request of communities seeking assistance to 
 
 21. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec‘y, The White House, Fact Sheet: The 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (June 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-sheet-and-expected-attendees-for-
todays-Rose-Garden-bill-signing/.  
 22. Wilson, supra note 10.  
 23. Id.; see also Walker, supra note 9 (―The FDA would also be able to prohibit 
companies from advertising their products in ways that appeal to kids—such as by 
adding clove or vanilla flavors —or labeling their smokes as ―light‖ or ―low tar,‖ or with 
other phrases suggesting a healthier cigarette.‖).  
 24.  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 3(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009).  
 25. §102(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b). 
 26. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 105, 123 Stat. 1776, 1841 (2009).  
 27. § 105(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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prevent underage tobacco use, the Secretary shall provide 
such assistance, including assistance with strategies to 
address the prevention of underage tobacco use in 
communities with a disproportionate use of menthol 
cigarettes by minors.‖28  Lastly, when commenting on the 
promulgation of this Act, President Obama proudly 
announced that the Tobacco Control Act crowns a ―decades-
long effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of 
smoking.‖29 
1. Legislative Findings in Support of the Tobacco Control 
Act‘s Goals 
In support of the Tobacco Control Act, the 111th Congress 
provided—in section two of the Act—relevant findings aimed 
toward its purported goals.30  Several examples of such 
findings enumerated in section two include paragraph four, 
which provides that ―[v]irtually all new users of tobacco 
products are under the minimum legal age to purchase such 
products.‖31  In fact, ―[r]educing the use of tobacco by minors 
by [fifty] percent would prevent well over 10,000,000 of 
today‘s children from becoming regular, daily smokers, saving 
over 3,000,000 of them from premature death due to tobacco-
induced disease.‖32 
Similarly, paragraphs five and fifteen state that tobacco 
advertising and marketing efforts aimed toward attracting 
young people have contributed considerably to the use of 
tobacco products by adolescents.33  Indeed, ―[i]n 2005, the 
cigarette manufacturers spent more than $13,000,000,000 to 
attract new users, retain current users, increase current 
consumption, and generate favorable long-term attitudes 
toward smoking and tobacco use.‖34  Importantly, paragraph 
 
 28. § 105(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 29. Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, MSNBC.COM (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31481823/from/ET/. 
 30.  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 2, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776–81 (2009). 
 31. § 2(4).  
 32. § 2(14). 
 33. § 2(5), (15).  
 34. § 2(16); see also § 2(48) (―In August 2006 a United States district court judge 
found that the major United States cigarette companies dramatically increased their 
advertising and promotional spending in ways that encourage youth to start smoking 
subsequent to the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998. USA v. 
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nineteen states that ―[t]hrough advertisements during and 
sponsorship of sporting events, tobacco has become strongly 
associated with sports and has become portrayed as an 
integral part of sports and the healthy lifestyle associated 
with rigorous sporting activity.‖35  With respect to other forms 
of entertainment, Congress posited that ―[t]he use of tobacco 
products in motion pictures and other mass media glamorizes 
its use for young people and encourages them to use tobacco 
products.‖36  
II.  HISTORY OF PRIOR ANTI-TOBACCO LEGISLATION, SPORTS 
RELATED RESTRICTIONS AND LITIGATION, AND 
CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACT 
The Tobacco Control Act is the culmination of a number of 
historical developments.  A review of the Act‘s antecedents 
and the challenges that those legislative attempts triggered 
may prove instructive to the application of the commercial 
speech framework, described below, to the Tobacco Control 
Act. 
A.  Prior Anti-Tobacco Legislation Restricting Advertising 
Although tobacco products have been promoted in the 
United States for over a century, it was not until the early 
1960s that the government became cognizant of the health 
risks associated with tobacco use.37  In 1964, the Surgeon 
General released an Advisory Committee Report on Smoking 
and Health that was founded on over 7000 scientific articles 
that ―highlighted the deleterious health consequences of 
tobacco use.‖38  The report revealed that cigarette smoking 
was ―responsible for a [seventy] percent increase in the 
mortality rate of smokers over non-smokers‖ and was 
specifically linked with cancer and other diseases such as 
bronchitis, emphysema, and coronary heart disease.39  
 
Philip Morris, USA, Inc., et al. (Civil Action No. 99-2496 (GK), August 17, 2006)‖). 
 35. § 2(19).  
 36. § 2(21); see also § 2(1), (6), (17), (21)–(28), (47). 
 37. The Reports of the Surgeon General: The 1964 Report on Smoking and Health, 
U.S. NAT‘L LIBR. MED., http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/NN/p-nid/60 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2011).  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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Commentators agree that this report had a significant impact 
on public attitudes toward tobacco use and subsequently 
enacted legislation.40  In fact, ―[a] Gallup Survey conducted in 
1958 found that only [forty-four] percent of Americans 
believed smoking caused cancer, while [seventy-eight] percent 
believed so by 1968.‖41   
In response to the Report warning that ―cigarette smoking 
is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United 
States to warrant appropriate remedial action,‖ Congress 
enacted a law in 1965 requiring warning labels on all 
cigarette packages distributed in the United States.42  This 
law—the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act43 (the 
―Cigarette Labeling Act‖)—enabled Congress to assume 
exclusive control over all aspects of cigarette promotion, 
labeling, and advertising, essentially precluding states from 
exercising any control.‖44  Shortly thereafter, Congress 
announced that the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) would require all licensed television and radio to 
provide ―a ‗significant amount of time‘—not equal time—to 
those who sought to present the case against cigarette 
smoking.‖45  Relying ―not only on the Fairness Doctrine[,]46 
but on the obligation of stations to serve the ‗public interest,‘‖ 
the FCC limited this promulgation ―to cigarettes, a product it 
held to be uniquely dangerous.‖47  Consequently, on April 1, 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 
(2006)). 
 44. Eric D. Brophy, Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health: Especially If You Are a 
Sports Advertiser, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 261, 265 (1998) (citing James C. Thorton, 
The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung Cancer: An Analysis of the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort 
Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 KY.  L.J. 569, 575 (1987)).  
 45. Ronald Bayer, Tobacco, Commercial Speech, and Libertarian Values: The End 
of the Line for Restrictions on Advertising?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 356, 356 (Mar. 
2002), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447076. 
 46. Id. The FCC developed the ―Fairness Doctrine‖ which requires ―publicly 
licensed television and radio stations to carry responses when they had taken positions 
on matters of public controversy.‖  Id. (the ―Fairness Doctrine‖ was adopted by the FCC 
in 1949 and mandated holders of broadcast licenses to present controversial issues to 
the public in a way that was (in the FCC‘s mind) honest, equitable and balanced).  
Accord 47 U.S.C § 301 (2006); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(upholding the FCC‘s general right to enforce the Fairness Doctrine where channels 
were limited). 
 47. Bayer, supra note 45, at 356. 
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1970, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act48 was signed 
into law by Richard Nixon and effectively banned the 
advertising of cigarettes on television and radio starting on 
January 2, 1971.49   
In 1984, Congress amended the Cigarette Labeling Act to 
require companies to put one of four warning labels on the 
cigarette containers, including: 
(1) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung 
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate 
Pregnancy; (2) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Quitting 
Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health; (3) 
SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant 
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low 
Birth Weight; or (4) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Cigarette 
Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.50  
A few years later, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco 
Health Education Act of 198651 extended the broadcast 
advertising ban to smokeless tobacco products.52 
Surprisingly, in light of the onslaught of health reports 
issued regarding the inherent dangers associated with tobacco 
products, cancer victims did not bring a class action against 
tobacco manufacturers for injuries suffered as a result of 
tobacco use53 until Broin v. Philip Morris Cos.54  Following 
this suit, tobacco companies had to defend themselves in a 
large number of similar cases, and, in 1998, after the 
culmination of a great deal of effort, these cases ended in a 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) ―involving more than 
[forty-six] states and the six largest tobacco companies.‖55  
 
 48. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1339 
(2006)). 
 49. Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline, TOBACCO.ORG, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/ 
history/Tobacco_Historynotes.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1335  
(―After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on 
any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC].‖).  
 50. Borio, supra note 49.  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (regarding 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act). 
 51. Pub. L. 99-252, 100 Stat. 330 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401 et seq. 
(2006)) 
 52. Borio, supra note 49. 
 53. Brophy, supra note 44, at 268–69. 
 54. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (flight attendants brought suit against 
tobacco producers for alleged in-flight inhalation of second hand smoke causing injury). 
 55. David L. Hudson, Jr., Advertising & First Amendment: Tobacco Ads, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR., http://www.firstamendmentjournal.com/speech/advertising/ 
topic.aspx?topic=tobacco_alcohol (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (noting that the six largest 
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Indeed, ―in the wake of insurmountable odds, the [tobacco] 
industry agreed‖ to pay billions of dollars in return for 
considerations, including agreements to settle nearly all 
litigation between parties.56  The tobacco companies agreed to 
place a number of marketing and advertising restrictions on 
themselves.  Examples of these self-imposed restrictions 
include the following:  
A ban on tobacco companies use of cartoon characters, such as 
―Joe Camel,‖ to advertise their products 
A ban on targeting youth in the advertising, promotion, or 
marketing of tobacco products 
A ban on tobacco company sponsorships for concerts or other 
events with significant youth audiences, including team 
sporting events, such as football games 
A ban on using tobacco brand names on stadium and arena 
advertisements57 
Interestingly, in response to these ―self-imposed‖ restrictions, 
some commentators posited that, had these restrictions come 
in the form of legislation as opposed to a settlement 
agreement, they would be deemed unconstitutional.58  
Lastly, in 2003, tobacco manufacturers, in conjunction 
with publishers from four large magazines, agreed to ban the 
placement of tobacco advertisements in school library editions 
of four publications.59  These four magazines were Time, 
People, Sports Illustrated, and Newsweek.60   
 
tobacco companies involved in the agreement included: Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Co., Lorillard Tobacco, Philip Morris Companies Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
Commonwealth Tobacco and Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.); Master Settlement 
Agreement, Nat‘l Ass‘n of Attorneys Gen., http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/ 
tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf/download. 
 56. See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 55; Brophy, supra note 44, at 
269; see also Hudson, supra note 55. 
 57. Hudson, supra note 55. 
 58. See id. (quoting Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal 
Foundation, stating that ―[m]any of the restrictions on advertising included in the 
settlement agreement could not be imposed legislatively because they would violate the 
First Amendment‖). 
 59. Cigarettes Advertising in U.S.A., PARLIAMENT CIGARETTES ONLINE (Mar. 31, 
2009), http://the-parliament-cigarette.blogspot.com/2009_03_29_archive.html. 
 60. Id. 
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B.  Sports Advertising Restrictions and Related Litigation 
Although enacted in the 1960s, tobacco companies did not 
challenge the Cigarette Labeling Act until 1995 when the 
Department of Justice brought its first civil suit against 
Madison Square Garden for failing to remove a Marlboro sign 
from the scorer‘s table.61  The owners soon agreed to remove 
the advertisement, and both parties asserted that an NBA 
rule required the sign‘s removal.62  The owners of Shea 
Stadium defended themselves against a similar suit, seeking 
removal of a Marlboro sign located below the scoreboard.63  
Shortly before the season commenced, the Mets switched the 
sign with a Sharp Electronics ad and noted that the Marlboro 
sign, in its new location, would ―only get[] fleeting glimpses on 
[television].‖64   
Litigation, however, was not limited to New York.  For 
example, in Michigan, the Detroit Tigers complied with 
demands to remove tobacco billboards in and around the 
stadium.65  Similarly, in Boston, Fenway Park ―owners were 
compelled by threats of federal sanction to remove a 
legendary Marlboro sign hanging above the stadium.‖66  Then, 
in 1997, ―[j]ust days before Super Bowl XXXI was to take 
place, the Justice Department‘s Office of Consumer Litigation 
sent a letter to Philip Morris attorneys requesting removal of 
[billboards containing tobacco advertisements], citing the 
extensive exposure of the signs during the Sugar Bowl.‖67  
Philip Morris removed the advertisements before the Justice 
Department brought any legal action.68 
 
 61. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270. 
 62. Id.; see also Richard Sandomir, New Formations for Stadium Signs, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/07/business/new-formations-for-
stadium-signs.html?pagewanted=1 (―[A] courtside Marlboro sign was removed at the 
beginning of the season in compliance with a new National Basketball Association 
policy.‖). 
 63. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270. 
 64. Sandomir, supra note 62. 
 65. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270. 
 66. Id. at 270–71. 
 67. Id. at 271. 
 68. Id. 
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C.  Challenges Voiced During the Legislative Enactment 
Process 
During a hearing in front of the House of Representatives, 
Representative Stephen Buyer expressed the following 
concerns with respect to the Tobacco Control Act: 
 While we all agree that steps need to be taken to help lessen the 
use of tobacco products by underage youth, we must not do so in 
ways that clearly violate the First Amendment.  Unfortunately, the 
bill in front of us I believe fails to meet that test. 
 The speech restrictions in this bill are clearly the most sweeping 
in the history of the United States for any legal product.  Numerous 
top legal experts from every point of the political spectrum have 
looked at these provisions and declared that they will not meet 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
. . . . 
 What we are doing in this body is two things: we are taking the 
[regulations] from the 1996 rule that the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional and we are making them statutory, which means, 
attention to lawyers in America: you have an access and avenue 
right back to Federal Court immediately upon the President‘s 
signature of this legislation. 
. . . . 
 In this case, it is commercial speech, and that is what we are 
doing.  When we take the MSA . . . and also place these restrictions 
and then make them statutory, bang, we are right back to the 
Supreme Court.  And I just find that very bothersome.  
. . . . 
. . . The paternalistic view that tobacco advertising must be 
restricted because consumers might find it pervasive is antithetical 
to the assumption on which the First Amendment is based.69 
At the same hearing, Representative Ronald Paul added 
the following: 
 
 69. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer), 155 
Cong Rec H 6630, at *6668 (LEXIS).  Accord id. at *6653 (regarding the potential 
challenges to the Act, Representative Buyer stated: ―So I would say to my good friend 
that as soon as this bill is signed into law, a couple of things are going to happen.  
Number one, the lawyers will make a run to the Federal courts, and the Supreme Court 
will be back sitting in judgment over the provisions on advertising restrictions, not only 
potential unconstitutional provisions on the First Amendment with regard to the 
regulation of commercial speech, but also in the Fifth Amendment with regard to 
whether it‘s a constitutional taking or not‖). 
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 One part of this bill that I find particularly bad, but it is 
pervasive in so much of what we do, about 100 years ago we took 
the First Amendment and freedom of speech and chopped it into 
two pieces.  We have political speech.  Of course we like that.  We‘re 
in the business of politics.  But we take commercial speech, and we 
put it over here, and we regulate the living daylights out of 
commercial speech.  That‘s not a First Amendment.  That‘s 
chopping freedom in half, and that just leads to more problems.  
But this will lead to prohibition, and it won‘t work.  This will just 
give us a lot more trouble.70 
The concerns voiced by these two representatives reflect 
the questions many tobacco regulators have regarding the 
constitutionality of restricting such commercial speech.  These 
constitutional questions concern whether the act satisfies the 
requisite commercial speech framework articulated in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York.71  
III.  COMMERCIAL SPEECH AUTHORITY AND THE CENTRAL 
HUDSON FRAMEWORK 
The specific provisions of the Tobacco Control Act that 
pertain to sports and entertainment advertising are the 
regulations of commercial speech.  For over a quarter of a 
century, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized that such speech is within the purview of the First 
Amendment,72 with the caveat that the speech ―must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading,‖73 false, or deceptive.74  
Although the Court has recognized that ―commercial speech 
receives a lower level of protection than other categories of 
expression,‖ it has also clarified that commercial speech 
nevertheless receives substantial protection.75  Indeed, 
 
 70. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul), 155 
Cong Rec H 6630, at *6655 (LEXIS). 
 71. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 72. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809, 822–25 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm‘n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973). 
 73. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 74. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (citing 
Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979).  
 75.  Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 589, 591 (1996); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‘n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) 
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commercial speech is vital to our society because it, ―not only 
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists 
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest 
possible dissemination of information.‖76  Realizing the 
importance of commercial speech protections, the Supreme 
Court, in Central Hudson, articulated a four-prong analysis 
under which courts can examine whether the First 
Amendment protects a specific commercial expression.77  
Because the specific provisions policing sports and 
entertainment advertisements are regulations of commercial 
speech, they must satisfy the requirements set forth in 
Central Hudson to be considered constitutionally sound.78  
A.  Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that it was 
incorrect to assume that commercial speech lacked value in 
the ―marketplace of ideas‖ or was not entitled to First 
Amendment protection.79  One year later, in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., the Supreme Court expanded the Bigelow holding and 
found that Virginia‘s overbroad ban on advertising the price 
of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment.80  The 
Court reasoned as follows: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price.  So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise 
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions.  It is a matter 
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well informed.  To this end, the free flow of 
commercial information is indispensable.81 
The Court elaborated as follows: 
 
(―[C]ommercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.‖). 
 76. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First 
Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2 (2000). 
 77. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). 
 80. 425 U.S. 748, 759–61 (1976). 
 81. Id. at 765. 
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 There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach.  That alternative is to assume that this information is 
not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best 
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best 
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather 
than to close them.82   
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions recognized that 
commercial speech ―occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation.‖83  Indeed, one commentator has 
posited that ―[t]he entire commercial speech doctrine . . . 
represents an accommodation between the right to speak and 
hear expression about goods and services and the right of 
government to regulate the sales of such goods and services.‖84  
In acknowledging the ―distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other 
varieties of speech,‖85 the Supreme Court promulgated a 
framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech 
that is ―substantially similar‖ to the test for ―time, place, and 
manner restrictions.‖86  The Supreme Court articulated this 
analysis, the Central Hudson four prong test,87 as follows: 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask 
 
 82. Id. at 770.  
 83. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‘n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (citing Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24). 
 84. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (alterations in 
original) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12–15, at 
903 (2d ed. 1988)).  
 85. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56). 
 86. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).  This idea of ―time, place, and 
manner restrictions‖ refers to the notion that ―[e]ven speech that enjoys the most 
extensive First Amendment protection may be subject to ‗regulations of the time, place, 
and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.‘‖  HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (2009) (quoting Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)). 
 87. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court was tasked with considering a 
regulation ―completely‖ prohibiting electrical utilities from engaging in promotional 
advertising designed to stimulate demand for electricity.  447 U.S. at 558.  Applying a 
four-part inquiry, the Court found that although the state interest in conservation of 
energy was substantial, and that there was ―an immediate connection between 
advertising and demand for electricity,‖ the regulation was nevertheless invalid 
because the commission failed to demonstrate that a more restrictive speech regulation 
would not have adequately served the State‘s interest.  Id. at 566, 569–71. 
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whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.88 
Indeed, the first prong concerns ―the informational 
function of advertising‖—namely, under this prong, if the 
communication does not ―accurately inform the public about 
lawful activity,‖ it may be suppressed.89  Under the second 
prong, if the speech is protected, the interest of the 
government in regulating and limiting it must be assessed—
that is, the government ―must assert a substantial interest to 
be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.‖90  Under 
the third prong, the restriction cannot be sustained ―if it 
provides only ineffective or remote support for the [asserted] 
purpose.‖91  Rather, the regulation must ―directly advance‖ 
the governmental interest asserted under the second prong.92  
Finally, under the fourth prong, ―if the governmental interest 
could be served as well by a more limited restriction on 
commercial speech, [an] excessive restriction[] cannot 
survive.‖93 
Applying this framework in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held 
that a Rhode Island law prohibiting advertisement of the 
price of alcohol ―in any manner whatsoever,‖ except by tags or 
signs inside liquor stores, was impermissible under the First 
Amendment.94  In applying the four-prong test, Justice 
Stevens asserted that the first prong was satisfied because 
―there [was] no question that Rhode Island‘s price advertising 
ban constitute[d] a blanket prohibition against truthful, 
 
 88. Id. at 566. 
 89. Id. at 563. 
 90. Id. at 564. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427 (1993) 
(reiterating that ―this question cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether 
the governmental interest is directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity,‖ 
instead the court must look to the aggregate effects). 
 93. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.  This prong has been altered by courts and 
now instead of the ―least restrictive means‖ test, a court must find a ―reasonable fit‖ 
between means and ends, with the means ―narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.‖  Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476–80 (1989). 
 94. 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). 
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nonmisleading speech about a lawful product.‖95  In 
addressing the second prong, the Court conceded that the 
government had a substantial interest in reducing alcohol 
consumption.96  As for prong three, Justice Stevens asserted 
that, ―speculation or conjecture‖ cannot ―suffice when the 
State takes aim at accurate commercial information for 
paternalistic ends.‖97  Indeed, Justice Stevens opined that, 
―without any findings of fact, or . . . any evidentiary support 
whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that [a] price 
advertising ban will significantly advance the State‘s interest 
in promoting temperance.‖98  With regard to the fourth prong, 
Justice Stevens found that Rhode Island had ―alternative 
forms of regulation [available] that would not involve any 
restriction on speech [and] would be more likely to achieve the 
State‘s goal of promoting temperance.‖99  Such alternatives 
included higher taxes, limited per capita purchases, and 
educational campaigns.100  Consequently, the Court concluded 
that ―even under the less than strict standard that generally 
applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to 
establish a ‗reasonable fit‘ between its abridgment of speech 
and its temperance goal.‖101  This decision is important 
because it provided guidance on future application of the 
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 
B.  Central Hudson Analysis in the Tobacco Regulation 
Context 
The Supreme Court‘s opinion in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly102 is instructive in the tobacco regulation area.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court rejected a set of anti-tobacco 
measures adopted by the State of Massachusetts designed to 
limit the reach of tobacco-related advertisements on young 
people.103  In Lorillard—as is the case with the Tobacco 
Control Act—the purpose of the restrictions was to address 
 
 95. Id. at 504. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 507 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)). 
 98. Id. at 505. 
 99. Id. at 507.  
 100. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.  
 101. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
 102. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 103. Id. at 562–63, 565–66. 
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the access to and use of tobacco products by children under 
the legal age.104  The Massachusetts regulation in question 
prohibited outdoor advertising of tobacco products within 
1000 feet of a school or playground.105  Evidence demonstrated 
that the 1000-foot rule would effectively bar outdoor 
advertising in as much as ninety-one percent of all land 
located in the State‘s largest cities.106  
In applying the Central Hudson analysis,107 the Court 
focused on the last two prongs related to the ―relationship 
between the harm that underlies the State‘s interest and the 
means identified by the State to advance that interest.‖108  In 
analyzing the third factor, Justice O‘Connor asserted that the 
State had to demonstrate that its regulations advanced the 
asserted regulatory interest and reiterated that ―mere 
speculation or conjecture‖ was insufficient.109  Rather, the 
State must ―demonstrate that the harms it recites are real 
and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree.‖110  The Court ultimately held, five to four,111 
that the State had met its burden under the third factor with 
respect to the advertising restrictions related to the 1000-foot 
rule for outdoor advertising.112  The Court, however, 
determined that the Massachusetts restrictions conflicted 
with the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.113  The 
effect of the 1000-foot rule would ―undoubtedly‖ vary from 
place to place and such a ―uniformly broad sweep of the 
geographical limitation demonstrate[d] a lack of tailoring.‖114  
Notably, the Court also faulted the Massachusetts regulation 
because it barred signs of all shapes and sizes rather than 
 
 104. Id. at 564. 
 105. Id. at 561–62. 
 106. Id. at 562. 
 107. Interestingly, the Court cursorily declined an invitation to apply strict scrutiny 
to questions regarding commercial speech and to reject the Central Hudson framework.  
See id. at 554–55.  Commentators, however, opine that the standard employed in cases 
such as Lorillard is ―intermediate scrutiny-plus.‖  See Conrad, supra note 4. 
 108. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 555. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass‘n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 
188 (1999)). 
 111. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
represented the majority while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
representing the dissenting opinions. 
 112. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 557–61.  
 113. Id. at 561. 
 114. Id. at 563. 
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focusing on signs that might appeal to adolescents in 
particular.115 
Most recently, in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United 
States, plaintiffs claimed that various provisions of the 
Tobacco Control Act violated their free speech rights under 
the First Amendment, their Due Process rights under the 
Fifth Amendment, and effected an unconstitutional taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.116  Specifically, the plaintiffs 
argued that the restrictions on the use of color and imagery, 
brand-name event sponsorships, branded merchandise, and 
bans on outdoor advertising violated several constitutional 
provisions.117  In ruling on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky began by noting that both parties agreed that the 
Central Hudson framework is the appropriate test to apply 
where the statute regulates commercial speech.118  
Importantly, in Commonwealth Brands, the plaintiffs argued 
that because Congress made no attempt to differentiate 
between marketing practices directed at adults versus those 
directed at children, the ban on brand-name sponsorships at 
athletic, social, and cultural events was overly broad.119  In 
support of this position, plaintiffs compared the MSA120 and 
the Tobacco Control Act: 
[W]hile the [MSA] permits ―specific types of brand name 
sponsorships, including those in adult-only facilities like bars and 
nightclubs,‖ the Act‘s ban on brand-name event sponsorship would 
prohibit Lorillard‘s Newport Pleasure Draw blackjack tournament, 
which, they argue, will not advance Congress‘s goal since that 
tournament is ―restricted to adult smokers‖ and held in an ―adult-
only facility‖ into which ―minors are not allowed to enter.‖121   
Simply put, plaintiffs argued that ―because Congress could 
have achieved its goal by restricting less speech . . . the Act‘s 
ban is not narrowly tailored under Central Hudson.‖122   
The court, however, rejected this contention and held that 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
 117. Id. at 521, 526. 
 118. Id. at 520. 
 119. Id. at 526. 
 120. For a detailed discussion of the MSA see supra Part II.A.  
 121. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 122. Id. 
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―the Act‘s ban is, in part, a reflection of Congress‘s view that 
the MSA is inadequate‖ because the MSA provides ways for 
tobacco manufacturers to ―successfully circumvent both the 
ban on television cigarette advertising and the intent of the 
[MSA] not to target youth.‖123  The court concluded by 
asserting that ―[i]n light of this evidence, the [c]ourt believes 
that there is a reasonable fit between the ends and the means 
of the sponsorship ban.‖124  
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON  TEST TO THE 
TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 
As a threshold matter, the Tobacco Control Act was 
seemingly drafted in anticipation of First Amendment 
challenges to its provisions restricting tobacco 
advertisements.  For instance, the Act seemingly addresses 
the Central Hudson considerations by providing that: 
 (31) The regulations . . . will directly and materially advance the 
Federal Government‘s substantial interest in reducing the number 
of children and adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco and in preventing the life-threatening health consequences 
associated with tobacco use . . . . Less restrictive and less 
comprehensive approaches have not and will not be effective in 
reducing the problems addressed by such regulations . . . .   
 (32) The regulations . . . impose no more extensive restrictions on 
communication by tobacco manufacturers and sellers than are 
necessary to reduce the number of children and adolescents who 
use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and to prevent the life-
threatening health consequences associated with tobacco use.  Such 
regulations are narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and 
promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by 
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use, while 
affording tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to 
convey information about their products to adult consumers.125 
Although the framers of the Tobacco Control Act 
seemingly packed a Central Hudson analysis into its 
provisions, this part will expressly apply the four-prong test 
espoused in the preceding section to the Act in an attempt to 
determine the likely outcome of a potential constitutional 
 
 123. Id. at 526–27.  
 124. Id. at 527. 
 125. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 2(31)–(32), 123 Stat. 1776, 1779 (2009). 
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challenge. 
A.  Lawful Activity and  Substantial Government Interest 
[Prongs One and Two] 
As was the case in Lorillard, and many cases that 
preceded it, the Tobacco Control Act can easily satisfy the 
first two prongs of the Central Hudson analysis.  Namely, 
under the first prong, the inquiry is merely whether the 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.126  If 
the answer is no, the speech is not protected and may be 
regulated without violating the First Amendment because 
―there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public 
about lawful activity.‖127  Conversely, if the answer is yes, 
prong two of the test dictates that the speech may be 
constitutionally regulated only if the government has a 
substantial interest in regulating the speech.128  In this 
instance, the speech restricted by the Tobacco Control Act is 
entitled to First Amendment protection because it concerns 
lawful activity and is not misleading, thereby satisfying prong 
one; and second, the importance of the government‘s interest 
in preventing use of tobacco-related products by minors is 
irrefutable, thereby satisfying prong two.  As the legislative 
findings substantiate, there is a palpable interest in 
preventing adolescent use of tobacco products, especially in 
light of the staggering statistical data regarding such use.129  
In fact, every day more than 3500 adolescents try a cigarette 
for the first time and another 1000 become new daily 
smokers, with one-third of these youth eventually dying 
prematurely as a result.130  As in other instances, ―the 
Supreme Court has steadfastly upheld restrictions on the 
First Amendment rights of children‖ aimed at their 
protection.131 
 
 126. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 564. 
 129. § 2(14). 
 130. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Is Necessary Federal 
Legislation, NATIONAL NEWS (April 29, 2009), http://notobacco.wordpress.com/2009/04/ 
29/family-smoking-prevention-and-tobacco-control-act-is-necessary-federal-legislation/. 
 131. Leonard J. Nannarone, Move over Joe Camel: Governmental Attempts to Ban 
Tobacco Advertising, 45 R.I. BUS. J. 11, 12 (1997). 
WIGGINTON_TOBACCO ADVERTISING.DOC 7/29/2011  11:01 AM 
2011] Tobacco Advertising out for Good? 555 
B.  Determining Whether the Act Directly Advances the 
Governmental Interest While Using the Most Restrictive 
Means [Prongs Three and Four] 
As with a great deal of case law discussing commercial 
speech, the third and forth prongs of the Central Hudson test 
are extremely fact-sensitive and must be examined cautiously 
and oftentimes in conjunction with one another.  As a 
threshold matter, the Supreme Court has reiterated ―in 
applying the third prong . . . courts should consider whether 
the regulation, in its general application, directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted.‖132  Indeed, as Justice 
O‘Connor reminded in Lorillard, ―mere speculation or 
conjecture‖ is insufficient, rather the government must 
―demonstrate that the harms it recites are real.‖133  With 
respect to the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis, 
the government must demonstrate that the proposed 
restrictions on advertising would have an impact on 
adolescent smoking, and that the proposed restrictions are 
sufficiently tailored to preclude unnecessary intrusions on 
expressive freedom.  To be sure, although the fourth prong 
does not explicitly require the government to adopt the 
precise method that advances regulatory objectives while 
simultaneously imposing the fewest speech restrictions, the 
means chosen must nonetheless be ―narrowly tailored.‖134 
C.  Analysis and Proposed Amendment 
In the legislative findings incorporated in the Tobacco 
Control Act, Congress has illustrated that there is not only a 
substantial government interest at stake but—statistically 
speaking—tobacco-related promotional efforts do in fact 
coincide with increases in adolescent tobacco use.135  As a 
result of these findings, it seems likely that the restrictions in 
the Act would directly advance the governmental interest in 
curbing adolescent tobacco use, thus satisfying the third 
 
 132. COHEN, supra note 86, at 7 (citing United States v. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. 418, 
427 (1993)).  
 133. Id. at 8 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass‘n v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 188 (1999)). 
 134. Bd. Of Trs. v. Fox, 192 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989). 
 135. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 2(5), (15), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777–78 (2009). 
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prong of Central Hudson.  
These restrictions, however, are simply too broad to satisfy 
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.136  To be sure, 
although there is a substantial government interest at stake, 
the provisions espoused in the Tobacco Control Act, 
restricting the means by which tobacco sponsors may 
advertise at sports and entertainment events are not 
sufficiently tailored to achieve the Act‘s purpose.  As the 
Court in Lorillard warned: 
The State‘s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is 
substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the sale 
and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity.  We must 
consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest 
in conveying truthful information about tobacco products. . . . As 
the State protects children from tobacco advertisements, tobacco 
manufacturers and retailers and their adult consumers still have a 
protected interest in communication.137  
Similarly, Representative Stephen Buyer‘s argument 
during the enactment of the Tobacco Control Act is 
illustrative in this instance.  There, he opined, ―[c]hildren 
deserve to be protected from inappropriate or harmful 
material, but the government may not use the guise of 
protecting children to impose sweeping restrictions on 
information intended for adults.‖138  One cannot simply call 
the Tobacco Control Act constitutionally sound merely 
because there is a tangible interest in protecting children 
from tobacco-related products.  As the Court reminded in 
Butler v. Michigan, the government may not ―reduce the adult 
population . . . to reading only what was fit for children.‖139  
 
 136.  See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).  Similarly, 
the fourth prong cannot be satisfied because the means implemented by Congress 
under this Act failed to exhaust other means to curb adolescent tobacco use.  As 
discussed above, the 111th Congress‘s primary goal in promulgating the Tobacco 
Control Act was to reduce the sale and use of tobacco by specifically focusing on the sale 
of tobacco products to adolescents under eighteen.  To achieve that end, however, rather 
than imposing a tax or sales restrictions on the retailing of tobacco products, the 
government has specifically attacked speech-related activities.  The Supreme Court, 
however, has clarified that the Constitution requires that such restrictions on truthful-
speech be implemented solely as a last resort.  See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).  
 137. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564. 
 138. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer), 
155 Cong. Rec. H 6630, at *6657 (LEXIS). 
 139. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).  Accord Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 74 (1983) (―The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to 
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A review of the case law developed in the preceding part 
reveals that the Supreme Court has consistently struck down 
restrictions on speech that were significantly more limited in 
scope than the Tobacco Control Act.  For instance, in Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a 
prohibition against listing alcohol content on beer labels, even 
though beer manufacturers were permitted to convey the 
same information to consumers via other channels.140  
Similarly, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., the 
Supreme Court struck down restrictions on placing 
commercial handbills in news racks on city streets, even 
though publishers had numerous other means of distributing 
their handbills.141  Lastly, in Bolger v. Young Drug Products 
Corp., the Supreme Court struck down a ban on direct-mail 
advertising of contraceptives, even though manufacturers still 
had numerous other methods available to advertise their 
products.142  In conjunction with the Lorillard decision, the 
case law cited above supports the proposition that the 
sweeping speech-related prohibitions espoused in the Tobacco 
Control Act simply cannot be deemed constitutional in light of 
Congress‘s failure to demonstrate that these restrictions are 
the least restrictive means of decreasing adolescent tobacco 
use.  Indeed, as one commentator has noted, ―a widespread 
ban [cannot] be justified on the grounds that it is designed to 
insulate minors from tobacco advertising.‖143   
Simply put, the speech restrictions contained in the 
Tobacco Control Act prohibiting the use of any tobacco brand 
names at any cultural, sporting, charitable or other event are 
too expansive, and can be seen as nothing more than an 
attempt by Congress to ―burn the house to roast the pig.‖144  
In order to be constitutionally sound, Congress should tailor 
the speech restrictions to those events that have a particular 
appeal to children.  To be sure, the Tobacco Control Act as it 
stands today would ban tobacco advertisements and 
sponsorships from activities ranging from the opera to beach 
volleyball.  Certainly, Congress cannot argue that an absolute 
ban on tobacco advertisements at these events is 
 
that which would be suitable for a sandbox.‖). 
 140. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 141. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 142. 463 U.S. 60. 
 143. Redish, supra note 75, at 593. 
 144. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.  
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constitutionally feasible because of the fact that children may 
attend these events.145   
A more narrowly tailored approach to restricting tobacco 
advertisements would be to ban the posting of such 
advertisements in the camera‘s view at sports and 
entertainment events aired on television, thus decreasing 
children‘s exposure.  Not surprisingly, statistical data 
illustrates that a greater percentage of the population 
watches sporting events on television as opposed to attending 
the actual events.146  Indeed, in 2009, the Los Angeles 
Dodgers reported the highest total MLB attendance for the 
season with 3,761,669 fans attending its games—all season.147  
Compare that with the 106,500,000 viewers that reportedly 
watched the Super Bowl on their television this year.148  The 
government, in this instance, is undoubtedly implementing a 
restriction that is unduly prejudicial to the adult attendees 
and the sports and entertainment sponsors if—statistically 
speaking—the number of adult attendees far exceeds that of 
attendees under the age of eighteen.  Clearly, a restriction on 
the tobacco advertisements aired on television would more 
appropriately address Congress‘s concern with adolescent 
exposure to tobacco-related advertisements at these events.  
Notably, the Tobacco Control Act seeks to prevent tobacco-
related advertisements at the following sporting events: 
football, baseball, basketball, soccer, and hockey,149 which 
represent the five sports most watched by teens on television.  
To be sure: approximately twenty-one percent of teens 
between the ages of twelve and eighteen reported watching 
football at least one time per month; approximately seventeen 
percent of teens reported watching basketball at least one 
time per month; approximately fifteen percent of teens 
 
 145. Although Congress attempted to address concerns of the speech-restrictions 
expansive reach by positing that even a single exposure by a child to tobacco-related 
advertising is effective in promoting tobacco-use, the Act fails to provide statistical data 
in support of this proposition. 
 146. 2009 MRI (Mediamark Research & Intelligence) Teenmark; Weighted by 
Population; Copyright © 2009, MRI All Rights Reserved [hereinafter Athletics 
Viewership] (on file with author). 
 147. MLB 2009 Attendance Report, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance/_/year/ 
2009 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) 
 148. Paul Kennedy, Good and Bad News for Soccer, SOCCER AM. DAILY (Nov. 24, 
2010), http://www.socceramerica.com/article/40537/good-and-bad-news-for-soccer.html. 
 149. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1830–33 (2009). 
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reported watching baseball at least one time per month; 
approximately seven percent of teens reported watching 
soccer at least one time per month; and approximately five 
percent of teens reported watching ice hockey at least one 
time per month.150  As a result of these findings, to achieve 
the government‘s goal of reducing the amount of youth 
smokers while curing this constitutional infirmity, Congress 
should amend the Tobacco Control Act to provide that only 
sports watched by more than ten percent of teens at least once 
per month should not have any tobacco-related 
advertisements visible during the entirety of the sporting 
event.  To be sure, a review of the statistics above 
demonstrates that the sports that are watched by more than 
ten percent of teens at least once a month are football, 
baseball, and basketball.  As such, any tobacco-related 
advertisements allowed at sports‘ stadiums or events should 
be out of the camera‘s view so that the children are not 
exposed to these advertisements while watching their favorite 
pastimes.  Notably, this was the Justice Department‘s goal in 
1995 when they filed a federal suit against Philip Morris 
―charg[ing] that the premium placement of Marlboro signs [in 
camera view] was designed to circumvent a twenty-four-year-
old ban on television cigarette advertising.‖151  Consequently, 
―department officials said they hoped [they would reach an] 
agreement [that] would prod other tobacco companies into 
moving their ads out of camera range.‖152   
Although the proposal above would still allow tobacco-
related advertisements to be posted in appropriate areas at 
sporting events, Congress should maintain an absolute ban on 
advertisements at other activities commonly attended by 
children.  For example, Congress should maintain an absolute 
ban on tobacco-related advertisements at activities geared 
toward adolescent attendance such as zoos and arcades.  An 
ancillary issue that narrower future legislation needs to 
address should be the idea that children who idolize athletes 
and performers should not be able to see these tobacco images 
associated with such role models.   
Utilizing a more systematic approach to regulating tobacco 
advertisements aimed toward an actual adolescent 
 
 150. Athletics Viewership, supra note 146. 
 151. Sandomir, supra note 62. 
 152. Id. 
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attendance would help alleviate the potentially prejudicial 
effects adult attendees and sports and entertainment 
sponsors suffer while simultaneously effectuating the 
government‘s interest in protecting the youth from an 
onslaught of tobacco advertisements at sports and 
entertainment events. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Tobacco Control Act expressly states that it 
will only develop regulations to the extent permitted by the 
First Amendment,153 the likelihood of a constitutional 
challenge to the Act, on the ground that it violates commercial 
speech rights, is palpable.154  As is the case with a great deal 
of anti-tobacco legislation that preceded the Tobacco Control 
Act, it is essential to keep in mind that while the goal of 
curbing adolescent tobacco use is certainly a noble endeavor, 
the constitutional protections afforded to citizens of the 
United States remain paramount.  The recently enacted 
Tobacco Control Act purports to reduce adolescent‘s access to 
tobacco products and to diminish the appeal of these products 
to the youth;155 however, the Act provides a blanket ban on 
not only the distribution of tobacco products at all sports and 
entertainment events but explicitly bars tobacco 
manufacturers from promoting their brands through 
sponsorships of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or 
cultural event[s].‖156   
Importantly, these provisions regulating sports and 
 
 153. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-31, § 2(30)–(32), 123 Stat. 1776, 1778–79 (2009); see also David Waldman, Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Daily Whip Line, CONGRESS MATTERS 
(June 12, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://www.congressmatters.com/storyonly/2009/6/12/1114/-
Family-Smoking-Prevention-and-Tobacco-Control-Act (―FDA would have authority to 
develop regulations that restrict the advertising and promotion of a tobacco product 
consistent with, and to the full extent permitted by, the [F]irst [A]mendment to the 
Constitution.‖).  
 154. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 10 (―The Association of National Advertisers says 
the act‘s ‗unprecedentedly broad advertising restrictions‘ violate First Amendment 
protections for commercial speech.  Legal experts say a court challenge on that ground 
is virtually certain.‖); TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 2 
(―[T]he judicial system will almost certainly be asked to adjudicate whether any of the 
legislated advertising restrictions unconstitutionally interferes with free speech under 
the First Amendment.‖). 
 155. Press Release, supra note 21.   
 156. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010). 
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entertainment advertisements are considered regulations of 
―commercial speech.‖  To be sure, the United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly accepted that such speech falls within 
the ambit of the First Amendment.157  Realizing the 
importance of commercial speech protections, in Central 
Hudson, the Supreme Court espoused a four-prong analysis 
under which courts can examine whether a specific regulation 
of commercial speech is an unconstitutional encroachment on 
the First Amendment.158  Under this analytical framework, 
the court must first determine whether the expression at 
issue concerns lawful activity that is not deceptive or 
misleading.159  Namely, under this prong if the 
communication does not accurately inform the public about 
lawful activity it may be suppressed.160  Second, the Court 
must ask whether the interest of the government in 
regulating and limiting the expression is substantial.161  
Third, the Court must determine whether the regulation 
proposed by the government directly advances the 
governmental interest.162  Lastly, the Court must examine 
whether a more limited restriction on commercial speech 
could serve the governmental interest.163  
In applying the Central Hudson test to the Tobacco 
Control Act, it is immediately evident that the first two 
prongs can be satisfied.  Indeed, the speech sought to be 
regulated under the Act is lawful and not misleading and 
there is certainly a substantial governmental interest at stake 
in curbing adolescent‘s access to and use of tobacco products.  
Similarly, the third prong of the Central Hudson analysis can 
be satisfied because, as the legislative findings to the Act 
illustrate, there is a strong correlation between the 
advertising and promotional efforts of tobacco products and 
adolescent tobacco use.164  Lastly, however, because the 
Tobacco Control Act provides for a blanket ban on tobacco-
 
 157. See infra, Part III. 
 158. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 159. Id. at 563 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 564 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 2(14), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009). 
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related advertisements at a plethora of sports and 
entertainment events, the government would not be able to 
demonstrate that its interest could not be served just as well 
by a having more limited restrictions on commercial speech.  
To cure this constitutional infirmity, the Tobacco Control 
Act should ban only those tobacco-related advertisements that 
television viewers of sports and entertainment events can see.  
Undeniably, more people—especially adolescents—are 
watching sports on television than attending actual sporting 
events.  Consequently, if the true aim of the Tobacco Control 
Act is to curb adolescent tobacco use by restricting the 
advertisements they are exposed to, a ban on advertisements 
outside of the purview of the camera would serve as the least 
restrictive means of effectuating the government‘s interest.  
Simply put, because the speech restrictions contained in the 
Tobacco Control Act are too expansive, Congress should tailor 
them to ensure that the government‘s interest in reducing 
child tobacco use is directly advanced while simultaneously 
maintaining the rights of adult viewers and tobacco sponsors.   
 
